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ABSTRACT: Within a single state, the age at which a minor can independently
obtain an abortion rarely aligns with the age at which she can legally have sex.
In the majority of states, parental involvement abortion laws constrain a minor
for a year or longer beyond the age of consent. During this time, the law
authorizes a minor to have sex while simultaneously declaring that, should she
become pregnant, she must seek permission-from a parent or a judge-to
obtain an abortion. Reasons supporting this status quo are outweighed by the
particular harms and obstacles-expressive and practical-created by this
dissonance. Minors who are "in the gap" are deprived of agency and choice on
the basis that they apparently only meet one standard of maturity but not
another. Minors who engage in legal sexual activity are being punished via the
judicial bypass process. Additionally, the law currently exhibits a bias toward
procreative over non-procreative sex, motherhood over non-motherhood.
Closing the gap between these laws would help to secure consistent freedom of
choice, prevent legal sexual contact from being controlled and punished, and
correct the law's default orientation toward stereotypical female roles. The ages
should be aligned, or at the very least, a maturity presumption should be used to
minimize the negative effects of this mismatch.
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INTRODUCTION
In most jurisdictions in the United States, the law authorizes a minor above
a certain age to have sex while simultaneously declaring that, should she
become pregnant, she must seek permission-from a parent or a judge-to
obtain an abortion. Statutory rape laws dictate the age boundaries of sexual
contact between two persons. Parental involvement laws require a minor
seeking an abortion to first either obtain the consent of or notify an adult in her
life, or, in the alternative, seek the permission of a judge through a "judicial
bypass" hearing. The age at which each of these laws no longer constrains
behavior rarely matches up in a single state; parental involvement laws
typically act on a minor for a year or longer after she can legally consent to
sex.' For those caught in this intersection, a legally consensual sexual
1. See infra Part II.
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encounter can, through any combination of contraceptive failure or imperfect
use, jettison a young, female-bodied person into the legal system. Having been
deemed sufficiently competent to make decisions as a sexual person, her ability
to control her body in a particular medical context remains conditioned on the
permission of an adult. She may be forced to confront abuse, homelessness,
unwanted pregnancy, and significant stigma, all for engaging in lawful activity.
The incongruence between these two types of laws should still concern
those of us who will not personally have to confront these practical realities.
The gap between the ages in these laws provokes questions of what should be
expressed through the law's treatment of sex and its consequences. It raises
concerns of the regulation of female bodies, the recognition of female capacity,
and preferences for traditionally gendered roles. Abortion regulations and
statutory rape laws have complex origins and have evolved over time in
response to various political and social pressures.2 They have each alternatively
been touted as important protective measures and decried as repressive. Their
current structure should be of great concern today insofar as these laws in
combination express our collective normative orientation toward sex and
maturity.
What should we make of the difference in age cutoffs for consent to sex
and to abortion? It is argued that the differential treatment is appropriate
because of the nature of the choices being made and the opinion of some that
abortion entails a significant third-party harm to a fetus. Alternatively or in
addition, what may be perceived as an unnecessary inconsistency could be an
example of an "incompletely theorized agreement,"4 a form of implicit
settlement important to the survival of a diverse community. Perhaps, the laws'
unique histories alone justify the current mismatch. These laws are and have
been subject to the influence of numerous interest groups over centuries and
decades.
However reasonable some may believe this mismatch to be, and however
beneficial it may be to allow controversial issues to rest where they have
settled, there are also significant harms. The questions at the core of this
inconsistency are playing out at great cost to young women and girls. The teens
within this gap face particular harms and obstacles-expressive and practical-
because of the dissonance created by the interrelation of these two regimes. The
state sends two messages, one affirming a capacity to responsibly consent to
the emotional and physical import of sexual conduct and another presuming an
incapacity to assess the realities of an abortion. Through the discord between
statutory rape and abortion laws, legal control over one's sexuality is divorced
from the management of the physical results of that sexuality. Even apart from
2. See infra Part 1.
3. See infra Part 1.
4. See infra Section IV.A.
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the normative arguments surrounding the existence of these laws, the ages
included within them structure the lives of teens and our societal orientation
toward sexuality and motherhood.
Given that minors' wellbeing hinges on our choices and important values
are at stake, we must individually and collectively consider the appropriate
stance to take on these questions. However historically grounded these laws
are, the debates circling them continue, and lawmakers are divided.5 Faced with
the current asymmetrical structure of ages to which minors' autonomy attaches,
we must decide whether and when individual agency should outweigh state
protection of youth.
I. HISTORY
Given its potential explanatory power, the historical evolution of these two
strands of law is a good place to begin when considering whether reform is
appropriate.
A. Statutory Rape Laws
Laws criminalizing sexual contact with young persons-traditionally
female persons-have a long history, with some sources citing their origin back
to Hammurabi's Code.6 The first statutory rape law in England outlined the
punishment "of him that doth ravish a Woman" who is under the age of consent
for marriage, then twelve years of age. The act was made a capital felony in
1285.8 A 1576 law lowered the age to ten years: "[I]f any person shall
unlawfully and carnally know and abuse any woman child under the age of ten
years, every such unlawful and carnal knowledge, shall be felony . . . ."9
5. Cf State Policy Updates: Major Developments in Sexual & Reproductive Health, GUT-rMACHER
INST., http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/updates/index.html (describing the progress of recent and
ongoing legislation, executive actions, and judicial decisions relating to abortion, sexuality, and teens,
many of which are stymied in divided state governments) (last visited April 17, 2016); Jon 0.
Shimabukuro, RL33467, Abortion: Judicial History and Legislative Response, CONG. RESEARCH SERV.
10-16 (Jan. 15, 2016), https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/RL33467.pdf (describing recent federal
legislative efforts related to abortion).
6. See Rita Eidson, Comment, The Constitutionality of Statutory Rape Laws, 27 UCLA L. REV.
757, 762 (1980) (citing C. EDWARDS, THE HAMMURABI CODE (1971)).
7. Statute of Westminster 1, 1275, 3 Edw. 1 c. 13 (Eng.) (I Statutes at Large 83) ("And the King
prohibiteth that none do ravish, nor take away by force, any Maiden within Age (neither by her own
Consent, nor without) . . . ."); see CAROLYN COCCA, JAILBAIT: THE POLITICS OF STATUTORY RAPE
LAWS IN THE UNITED STATES 10 (2004) (noting that females under twelve were "regarded as unable to
consent"); Eidson, supra note 6, at 762 n.35.
8. Statute of Westminster II, 1285, 13 Edw. I c. 34 (Eng.) ("[I]f a Man from henceforth do ravish a
Woman married, Maid, or other, where she did not consent, neither before nor after, he shall have
Judgement of Life and of Member.").
9. 18 Eliz. c. 7 (1576). The death penalty was maintained for sexual offenses against girls under the
age of ten until 1841. See SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, MAXIMUM PENALTIES FOR SEXUAL
PENETRATION WITH A CHILD UNDER 16: REPORT 1 7.4 n.272 (2009).
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Blackstone clarified that this law was not meant "to create a new offense but to
declare that a girl under the age of ten was incapable of judgment and
discretion and thus unable to give legal consent." 0 The 1576 statute has been
held to be included in the common law carried to the United States," and
indeed early American statutory rape laws mirrored this language.1 2 Over time,
individual states increased the ages of consent, often to eighteen or even
higher. 13
Despite Blackstone's focus on consent, many sources have emphasized that
female autonomy and protection of children were not the Parliament's concerns
in passing these laws.14 Rather, early laws regulating sex with girls were
focused on preserving the father's property interest in his daughter's purity and
eligibility for marriage.' 5 Although statutory rape was initially a strict liability
offense, two defenses emerged in the American conception that, if accepted,
would permit the offense to be downgraded to a less severe charge of
fornication.' 6 These defenses were: (1) mistake as to the victim's age-which
was not generally accepted until the mid- 1900s' 7-and (2) claiming that the
victim was not "of previously chaste character"-a feature which was
incorporated in most states early on and remained in some states as late as the
1990s.18 These defenses reflect a concern with the purity of the victim rather
than her age. Over time, the driving force behind statutory rape laws shifted
from concern about the father's financial interests to protection of young
10. Eidson, supra note 6, at 762 (quoting 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES 212 (9th ed.
1783)); see also Nider v. Commonwealth, 131 S.W. 1024, 1026 (Ky. 1910) (stating that the law "was
passed in aid of the common law, that is, to supply a deficiency or an omission in that law").
I1. Nider, 131 S.W. at 1026 ("That this parliamentary statute is a part of the common law in force
in this state, except to the extent that it has been modified by section 1155 of the Kentucky Statutes, is
apparent from a consideration of the section of the Constitution and the cases before mentioned.").
12. See COCCA, supra note 7, at 11.
13. Frances Olsen, Statutory Rape: A Feminist Critique of Rights Analysis, 63 TEX. L. REv. 387,
403-04 (1984) (noting that individual states set their ages of consent as high as twenty-one).
14. See COCCA, supra note 7, at 11; SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 9, ¶7.5.
15. See, e.g., COCCA, supra note 7, at 11; SENTENCING ADVISORY COUNCIL, supra note 9, 1 7.5;
Eidson, supra note 6, at 767 ("Chaste young maidens were bought and sold in marriage, and a man who
deprived a girl of her chastity was also depriving her father of a bride price." (footnote omitted)).
16. See COCCA, supra note 7, at 11.
17. See id.; Note, Statutory Rape: A Growing Liberalization, 18 S.C. L. REV. 254, 265 (1966)
("The possible start of a new and liberal trend occurred recently in California, when the Califomia court
found that a specific statement negating the common law requirement of mens rea was needed in the
statute in order to void a mistake of fact defense." (citing People v. Hernandez, 393 P.2d 673 (Cal. Sup.
Ct. 1964))).
18. See COCCA, supra note 7, at 11-12 (internal quotation marks omitted) (noting that the
requirement persisted until a change to Mississippi's code in 1998); see also Note, Statutory Rape, supra
note 17, at 259 ("The benefits of a requirement of chastity of a prosecutrix over twelve are obvious. The
requirement strikes to the very heart of the statutory rape problem by protecting only the innocent. It
requires no great imagination to picture a situation in which a relatively inexperienced male becomes
sexually involved with an underage female who is actually little better than a prostitute. Justice would
seem to cry out against the 'protection of the defiled."' (quoting State v. Snow, 252 S.W. 629 (Mo.
1923))).
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people from abuse by adults.19 However, as many of these laws were still
gender specific, they particularly targeted male aggression toward vulnerable
women and girls.2 0 For feminists, these laws existed at a nexus of conflicting
concerns: aggressive male sexuality on one hand and, on the other, the
restriction of female sexual autonomy in a way that reinforced sexist
stereotypes. The latter focus ultimately won out, as "[t]he nineteenth century
concern with oppressive male initiative was replaced in the mid-twentieth
century by concern with state repression of sexuality."2 1 Feminist critiques
were countered with reasons for gender-specific laws, including prevention of
22
vaginal injury, risk of pregnancy, and welfare dependence. Michael M v.
Superior Court of Sonoma County,23 the only U.S. Supreme Court case to
address statutory rape laws, upheld California's gendered statutory rape law
24
against an Equal Protection Clause challenge. The Court reasoned that the
legislature was entitled to "provide for the special problems of women," 25
including "illegitimate teenage pregnancies" and the associated heightened risk
26
of abortion and need for state support, as well as young girls' particular
susceptibility to "physical injury from sexual intercourse."2 7 The plurality
opinion in Michael M also accepted that gender-neutral laws were not
necessary because these social, physical, and economic consequences would
sufficiently deter young female persons from sexual contact, whereas male
persons would not be adequately deterred without criminal consequences. 28
Even as states revised the language of their laws in accordance with feminist
critiques in the latter half of the twentieth century,29 teen sex continued to be
associated with extramarital pregnancy and public assistance in the discourse
around statutory rape laws.30
19. See Daryl J. Olszewski, Statutory Rape in Wisconsin: History, Rationale, and the Need for
Reform, 89 MARQ. L. REV. 693, 698-99 (2006).
20. See id. at 694-95. Carolyn Cocca notes that this concern did not extend to non-white women:
"Black females were generally formally enslaved, and for a variety of political, economic, social, and
cultural reasons their sexuality was not deemed to be in need of legal protection." COCCA, supra note 7,
at 11.
21. Olsen, supra note 13, at 404.
22. See Eidson, supra note 6, at 760-61 (noting the perceived need for special protections for
females against injury and possibility of pregnancy); Olszewski, supra note 19, at 699-700 (listing
among the reasons most commonly cited for statutory rape laws the related concerns of teen pregnancy
and welfare dependence).
23. 450 U.S. 464 (1981).
24. Id. at 476.
25. Id. at 469 (quoting Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636, 653 (1975)).
26. Id. at 470-71.
27. Id. at 475.
28. See id.
29. See Olsen, supra note 13, at 404 ("Partly in response to these criticisms and partly to avoid
constitutional challenge, most states revised their statutory rape laws to make them gender-neutral, and
many states decriminalized sex among teenagers."). For a more detailed account of the various forces
shaping American statutory rape law, see COCCA, supra note 7, at 9-28.
30. COCCA, supra note 7, at 27 ("The link forged between statutory rape, the number of births to
teen mothers, and public assistance expenditures served to reinvigorate funding and prosecutorial efforts
[Vol. 28:171176
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B. Parental Involvement Laws
In 1973, the Supreme Court in Roe v. Wade 3 1 prohibited states from
restricting abortion during the first trimester of pregnancy, overturning laws in
32
forty-six states. In response, many states sought ways to limit the scope of the
newly declared abortion right by passing parental involvement laws.33 Such
laws require a minor under a designated age to either notify or obtain consent
from a parent (or, in some cases, another adult authority figure). These laws are
promoted on numerous grounds, including minors' physical and mental
wellbeing, informed consent, and protection from coercion and abuse. 34
The Supreme Court first ruled on the validity of a parental consent statute
three years after Roe in Planned Parenthood of Central Missouri v. Danforth.35
There, the Court struck down a law that conditioned a minor's access to
abortion on consent from a parent or guardian unless the abortion was
36
necessary to save her life. It held that a state "does not have the constitutional
authority to give a third party an absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto over the
decision of the physician and his patient to terminate the patient's pregnancy,
regardless of the reason for withholding the consent." 37 The Court applied and
clarified the Danforth standard in Bellotti v. Baird.8  In Bellotti, a
Massachusetts parental consent statute was held to be constitutionally infirm
because of two elements: (1) the statute did not give minors the option to seek
judicial authorization without first consulting an available parent, and (2) the
law permitted a judge to deny an abortion to a minor who has been found to be
mature and competent.3 9 The court concluded that "if the State decides to
require a pregnant minor to obtain one or both parents' consent to an abortion,
it also must provide an alternative procedure whereby authorization for the
toward the crime, while also undermining the gender-neutral language of the laws by focusing on young
women as victims.").
31. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
32. See Anna C. Bonny, Parental Consent and Notification Laws in the Abortion Context:
Rejecting the "Maturity" Standard in Judicial Bypass Proceedings, II U.C. DAVIS J. Juv. L. & POL'Y
311, 314 (2007); Steven F. Stuhlbarg, Note, When Is a Minor Mature? When Is an Abortion in Her Best
Interests? The Ohio Supreme Court Applies Ohio's Abortion Parental Notification Law: In Re Jane Doe
1, 566 N.E.2d 1181, 60 U. CIN. L. REV. 907, 909 (1991).
33. See Bonny, supra note 32, at 314; Stuhlbarg, supra note 32, at 909.
34. See, e.g., Mary E. Harned, Consent Denied: The Need for Informed Consent and Parental
Involvement, DEFENDING LIFE 2014 (Americans United for Life, D.C.), Jan. 12, 2016, at 34; Carol
Sanger, Regulating Teenage Abortion in the United States: Politics and Policy, 18 INT'L J.L., POL'Y &
FAMILY 305, 306 (2004) (citing a 1997 Alaska statute, which includes a representative explanation of its
purposes: "protecting minors against their own immaturity; fostering the family structure and preserving
it as a viable social unit; protecting the rights of parents to rear children who are members of their
household; and protecting the health of minor women").
35. 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
36. Id. at 58.
37. Id. at 74.
38. 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
39. Id. at 651.
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abortion can be obtained."4o Parental involvement laws across the country now
echo the requirements for this "alternative procedure" articulated by four
members of the Bellotti Court:
A pregnant minor is entitled in such a proceeding to show either: (1)
that she is mature enough and well enough informed to make her
abortion decision, in consultation with her physician, independently of
her parents' wishes; or (2) that even if she is not able to make this
decision independently, the desired abortion would be in her best
interests. The proceeding in which this showing is made must assure
that a resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be
completed with anonymity and sufficient expedition to provide an
effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained. In sum, the
procedure must ensure that the provision requiring parental consent
does not in fact amount to the "absolute, and possibly arbitrary, veto"
that was found impermissible in Danforth.4
The Court did not define "maturity" or "best interests," providing little
42guidance to lower courts as to which factors may appropriately be considered.
Other Supreme Court opinions have noted the troublesome vagueness of this
wording,43 but they remain the standards by which minors' requests for
abortion are judged.
The Court has also had ample opportunity to rule on the constitutionality of
parental notification statutes. In H.L. v. Matheson, the majority held that "a
statute setting out a 'mere requirement of parental notice' does not violate the
constitutional rights of an immature, dependent minor."44 Justices Powell and
Stewart wrote separately to emphasize that, although the judgment was correct
in this case, the state must make an alternative judicial bypass option available
to an individual who "believes that she is mature enough to make the abortion
decision independently or that notification otherwise would not be in her best
40. Id. at 643.
41. Id. at 643-44.
42. See Suellyn Scamecchia & Julie Kunce Field, Judging Girls: Decision Making in Parental
Consent to Abortion Cases, 3 MICH. J. GENDER & L. 75, 78 (1995).
43. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 474 (1990) (Marshall, J., concurring) ("The
constitutional defects in any provision allowing someone to veto a woman's abortion decision are
exacerbated by the vagueness of the standards contained in this statute. The statute gives no guidance on
how a judge is to determine whether a minor is sufficiently 'mature' and 'capable' to make the decision
on her own."); Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 655 (1979) (Stevens, J., concurring in judgment) ("[The
best interest] standard provides little real guidance to the judge, and his decision must necessarily reflect
personal and societal values and mores .... ").
44. 450 U.S. 398, 409 (1981); see also Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 420 (Kennedy, J., concurring in
judgment and dissenting in part) ("[Tihe Court [in H.L. v. Matheson] held that a two-parent notice
statute without a bypass was constitutional as applied to immature minors whose best interests would be
served by notice.").
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interests."45 Noting this tension in Matheson, Justice Kennedy later encouraged
the use of judicial bypass procedures:
If a two-parent notification law may be constitutional as applied to
immature minors whose best interests are served by the law, but not as
applied to minors who are mature or whose best interests are not so
served, a judicial bypass is an expeditious and efficient means by
which to separate the applications of the law which are constitutional
from those which are not.46
In Hodgson v. Minnesota, a majority of the Court held that the existence of
a judicial bypass option saved an otherwise constitutionally objectionable
requirement that a minor notify both parents.4 7 In Ohio v. Akron Center for
Reproductive Health, the Court held that "a bypass procedure that will suffice
for a consent statute will also suffice for a notice statute" because consent
statutes were more intrusive.48 The Court declined to decide whether parental
notification laws must contain the same procedures as are required for parental
consent statutes.49 In practice, states have created similar methods of judicial
bypass in both contexts.
The Supreme Court considered a parental notification statute most recently
in Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood of Northern New England.50 Below, the
District Court, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, invalidated the act because it
did not contain a health exception and constrained physicians' medical
judgment.5 i The Supreme Court considered the propriety of striking down the
law rather than enjoining its application only where it would threaten the
52
mother's health. Ultimately, the Court remanded the case without creating a
remedy, deferring to the lower courts and state government.5 3
In the decades since Roe, statutes have been introduced at the state and
federal levels to encourage parental involvement in the abortion decision 54 and
45. Matheson, 450 U.S. at 420 (Powell, J., concurring).
46. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 500 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment and dissenting in part).
47. Id. at 455 (Kennedy, J., dissenting on that point).
48. 497 U.S. 502, 511 (1990).
49. Id. at 510. But see id. at 526 (Blackmun, J., dissenting) (stating that "a parental-notice statute is
tantamount to a parental-consent statute" in practical effect and thus must also contain a bypass
procedure).
50. 546 U.S. 320 (2006).
51. Id. at 325.
52. Id. at 328-29.
53. Id. at 331-32. The 2003 New Hampshire law was repealed by the state legislature in 2007,
before the lower court could rule on remand. See Ayotte v. Planned Parenthood for Northern New
England, CTR. FOR REPROD. RIGHTS (2008), http://www.reproductiverights.org/case/ayotte-v-planned-
parenthood-for-northern-new-england; Karen Dandurant, Planned Parenthood to Have Attorney's Fees
Paid, SEACOASTONLINE.COM (Sept. 4, 2008),
http://www.seacoastonline.com/apps/pbcs.dll/article?AID=/20080904/NEWS/80904028.
54. See Abortion: Parental Consent, Opposing Viewpoints Online Collection, GALE GROUP (2014),
http://ic.galegroup.com/ic/ovic/ReferenceDetailsPage/DocumentToolsPortletWindow?displayGroupNa
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have been enacted in the vast majority of states. These laws have been
justified on the basis that they improve minors' safety and choices. As
evidenced by the long line of Supreme Court cases considering the validity of
parental involvement statutes, abortion-rights advocates have persistently
challenged these laws as unduly burdensome and dangerous to girls' health and
safety. 57
II. CURRENT STATE OF THE LAW
The majority of states-thirty-eight-actively enforce some degree of
parental involvement in a minor's abortion decision. Eight states do not require
any parental involvement,5 and five have passed laws that are currently
enjoined by a court order and thus not in effect.59 All but two states' parental
notice or consent requirements apply to all pregnant persons under eighteen.60
The age of consent ("at which an individual can legally consent to sexual
intercourse under any circumstances") is generally lower: sixteen years old in
thirty-three states plus Washington, D.C.; seventeen years old in six states.6 1
Only eleven states set the age of consent at eighteen, and further, only three of
those eleven prohibit sexual intercourse for unmarried minors under eighteen in
all circumstances.62 Additionally, many states permit legal sexual intercourse
with someone under the age of consent in some circumstances-when the other




55. See Sanger, supra note 34, at 305 & 316 n.l (noting that over 44 states have enacted parental
involvement laws, with at least 10 states' laws being held unconstitutional).
56. See, e.g., Harned, supra note 34, at 34-36.
57. See, e.g., Mandatory Parental-Involvement Laws Threaten Young Women's Safety, NARAL
PRO-CHOICE AMERICA (2016), http://www.prochoiceamerica.org/media/fact-sheets/abortion-young-
women-parental-involvement.pdf; New Research Confirms Harmful Impact of Texas Abortion
Restrictions, JANE'S DUE PROCESS BLOG (Oct. 7, 2015), http://janesdueprocess.org/new-research-
confirms-harmful-impact-of-texas-abortion-restrictions.
58. These states are Connecticut, Washington, D.C., Hawaii, Maine, New York, Oregon, Vermont,
and Washington. State Policies in Brief Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortions, GUrMACHER
INST. (2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibPIMA.pdf [hereinafter Parental
Involvement in Minors' Abortions].
59. These states are California, Montana, Nevada, New Jersey, and New Mexico. Id.
60. The exceptions are Delaware, which has a parental notification law that applies to those under
sixteen, and South Carolina, which has a consent requirement that applies to those under seventeen. See
id.;, Parental Consent and Notification Laws, PLANNED PARENTHOOD (last visited May 10, 2016),
https://www.plannedparenthood.org/learn/abortion/parental-consent-notification-laws.
61. Asaph Glosser et al., Statutory Rape: A Guide to State Laws and Reporting Requirements,
LEWIN GROUP 5-7 (Dec. 15, 2004), https://aspe.hhs.gov/sites/default/files/pdf/75531/report.pdf. This
collection of state data was compiled by the Lewin Group under contract with the U.S. Department of
Health and Human Services (HHS). Although its information is from 2004, statutory rape laws have
fluctuated less than minors' abortion laws, and the report continues to be regularly cited.
62. Id.
63. Id.
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activities with an unmarried minor as young as twelve or thirteen (or even ten
in South Dakota) provided the age differential between parties is within a
particular window and/or other conditions are met.6
Combining these data, it appears that twenty-nine states set their age of
consent below their parental involvement requirement age (the age at which the
requirement is no longer applicable).6 Eight states have an age of consent that
is the same as their parental involvement requirement age of eighteen. 66 Of
those eight, Arizona, Florida, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, and Virginia
have a minimum age of victim that is lower than their age of consent, thus
allowing that there will be circumstances in which a minor can have legal sex
without being able to access an abortion until she turns eighteen.67 Only one
outlier state, Delaware, has an age of consent that is above its parental
68involvement law. In sum, the current regime is characterized by states which
allow minors to have legal sex earlier, and often much earlier, than they allow
minors to access abortion without involvement by an adult or another authority
figure.
III. LITERATURE REVIEW
Many academics have discussed either statutory rape or parental
involvement laws, but their intersection has been explored less thoroughly. As
discussed above, liberal and radical feminists have struggled with and debated
the merits and risks of statutory rape laws and the state's involvement in the
regulation of sex.6 9 Specific formulations of state laws have been targeted for
reform or defended as necessary protections, as have the ages deemed
appropriate for regulation.70 Likewise, parental involvement laws have been
64. Id. at 5-8.
65. According to the Lewin Group and Guttmacher Institute data, the following states fall into this
category: Alabama, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Georgia, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky,
Louisiana, Maryland, Massachusetts, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Missouri, Nebraska, New
Hampshire, North Carolina, Ohio, Oklahoma, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, South
Dakota, Texas, West Virginia, and Wyoming. See Parental Involvement in Minors' Abortions , supra
note 58; Glosser et al., supra note 61, at 5-7. See also infra Appendix A.
66. These states are Arizona, Florida, Idaho, North Dakota, Tennessee, Utah, Virginia, and
Wisconsin. See Parental Involvement in Minors'Abortions, supra note 58; Glosser et al., supra note 61,
at 5-7.
67. Glosser et al., supra note 61, at 5-7. The fact that these six states allow minors under their age
of consent to have legal sex in some circumstances means that only Idaho and Wisconsin's laws treat
minors' ability to consent to abortion and sex in a consistent manner.
68. Parental Involvement in Minors'Abortions, supra note 58; Glosser et al., supra note 61, at 5-7.
69. See supra notes 21and 56-57and accompanying text; see also Heidi Kitrosser, Meaningful
Consent: Toward a New Generation of Statutory Rape Laws, 4 VA. J. Soc. POL'Y & L. 287, 287-88
(1997) (discussing feminist debates over the more recent shift toward gender neutral statutory rape laws
with age gap provisions); Kate Sutherland, From Jailbird to Jailbait: Age of Consent Laws and the
Construction of Teenage Sexualities, 9 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 313 (2003); Eidson, supra note 6.
70. See, e.g., COCCA, supra note 7 (examining age-span provisions, gender-neutral language, and
prosecution of partners of pregnant teens); JUDITH LEVINE, HARMFUL TO MINORS: THE PERILS OF
PROTECTING CHILDREN FROM SEx 68-89 (2002); Olszewski, supra note 19; Lisa Pearlstein, Note,
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assessed by courts, practitioners, advocacy groups, and academics. Some
writers have critiqued the very existence of parental involvement laws7 1 or the
11 ~ 72 7
"maturity" requirement. Others, like Helena Silverstein, have focused their
critiques on the implementation of these statutes, while arguing the theoretical
value of parental involvement laws as safeguards. The merits, failures, and
detriments of both statutory rape laws and parental involvement statutes have
been explored numerous times over many decades.
However, these laws, both of which bear on the sexual lives of teens and
their autonomy, have only rarely been studied jointly, as I have attempted to do
in this piece. Where they are discussed together, authors typically do so only
briefly, using one category of laws as a baseline to which a reader should
compare the other. For example, Michelle Oberman classifies the "presumption
underlying modem law governing adolescent girls' sexuality" as "that girls are
mature enough to make autonomous decisions regarding sexuality"; she
challenges that assumption by contrasting the statutory rape regime with other
comparable laws.74 Oberman discusses a variety of "mature minor" consent
laws, including abortion, contraception, STI treatment, and sterilization.7 1 She
suggests that modem statutory rape laws "emerge as puzzling exceptions to the
legal system's general skepticism about minors' capacity to consent. . . . [T]he
modem application of statutory rape laws focuses on cases of non-consensual
sex. Thus, the criminal law seems to suggest that at least some minors are
capable of rendering a meaningful consent to sex"-although, she adds,
literature on adolescent development indicates that that is generally not the
case.76 Malinda Seymore focuses on the inconsistency between the law's
Walking the Tightrope of Statutory Rape Law: Using International Legal Standards To Serve the Best
Interests of Juvenile Offenders and Victims, 47 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 109, 111 (2010) (advocating
minimum ages of prosecution, rehabilitation over incarceration, and consideration of a minor's
preferences).
71. See, e.g., Jennifer Blasdel, Mother, May I?: Ramifications for Parental Involvement Laws for
Minors Seeking Abortion Services, 10 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL'Y & L. 287 (2002); Carol Sanger,
Decisional Dignity: Teenage Abortion, Bypass Hearings, and the Misuse of Law, 18 COLUM. J. GENDER
& L. 409 (2009); Sanger, supra note 34; Alexandra Rex, Note, Protecting the One Percent: Relevant
Women, Undue Burdens, and Unworkable Judicial Bypasses, 114 COLUM. L. REV. 85 (2014); Abortion
and Parental Involvement Laws: A Threat to Young Women s Health and Safety, ADVOCATES FOR
YOUTH,
http://www.advocatesforyouth.org/storage/advfy/documents/abortion%20and%20parental%20involvem
ent%201aws.pdf (last visited Apr. 17, 2016); JANE'S DUE PROCESS, http://janesdueprocess.org (last
visited Jan. 12, 2016) (a legal services and advocacy organization that assists Texas minors in accessing
abortion via judicial bypass).
72. See, e.g., Bonny, supra note 32; Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 42.
73. See generally HELENA SILVERSTEIN, GIRLS ON THE STAND: How COURTS FAIL PREGNANT
MINORS (2008).
74. Michelle Oberman, Turning Girls into Women: Re-Evaluating Modem Statutory Rape Law, 85
J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 15, 22 (1994).
75. Id. at 46-53.
76. Id. at 53; see also Lewis Bossing, Note, Now Sixteen Could Get You Life: Statutory Rape,
Meaningful Consent, and the Implications for Federal Sentence Enhancement, 73 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1205
(1998). Bossing's note briefly mentions abortion, among other "mature minor" rules allowing minors to
independently consent to medical care, to indicate that teens are often found able to make autonomous
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treatment of a minor's abortion decision and her freedom to carry to term and
place her child up for adoption. In the course of her analysis, Seymore raises
statutory rape as one of several examples of the law's differential treatment of
78
minors. She cites specifically how the laws are justified on the basis of
minors' vulnerability in their interactions with adults79 and on the importance
of parental authority.so Although many authors have drawn comparisons
between statutory rape laws and abortion access as examples of the law's
treatment of minors, it is less common to find pieces that deeply analyze both
types of statutes.
Even more difficult to find among existing literature is an analysis or
critique of the ages in these two contexts or a consideration of how these two
regimes interact. Nicole Phillis's article is one of the rare sources to identify
and directly challenge the incongruity between ages of consent and parental
involvement laws. She articulates the tension of this incongruity as an example
of a "protectionist-versus-enablement paradigm."81 Phillis argues that
recognizing a minor's maturity through age of consent laws while depriving her
of independent access to abortion imposes an undue burden on her right-as a
legally mature person-to abortion access under Casey.82 Her proposed remedy
is the creation of a "Minor Consent Capacity" (MCC) status, a form of consent
capacity licensure, which would be based on minors' satisfaction of sexual
education requirements.83
Phillis's article most closely addresses the concerns highlighted in this
piece, illuminating the conflicting orientation toward teenagers' sexual and
reproductive maturity and raising policy issues associated with the current
regime. Phillis focuses on a constitutional critique under Planned Parenthood
84
of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey and raises important expressive and
practical concerns, some of which intersect with my arguments against the
choices. Id. at 1229-30, 1229 n.121, 1230 n.122. Interestingly, he uses abortion as a context in which
minors are granted freedom to choose and uses this characterization to suggest the opposite of
Oberman's premise-that statutory rape law is an outlier in presuming nonconsent-and propose a
modification. Id. at 1231.
77. Malinda L. Seymore, Sixteen and Pregnant: Minors' Consent in Abortion and Adoption, 25
YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 99, 103 (2013).
78. Id. at 124.
79. Id. at 124-25 ("The vulnerability of young girls in the face of seduction efforts of older men
informs statutory rape laws.").
80. Id. at 126 ("The origin of statutory rape laws, for example, rested in the father's ownership of
his daughter, as with laws relating to parental consent for early marriage. The justification for laws
limiting a minor's right to consent to or refuse medical treatment rests on this concept of parental
authority.").
81. Nicole Phillis, When Sixteen Ain't So Sweet: Rethinking the Regulation ofAdolescent Sexuality,
17 MICH. J. GENDER& L. 271, 275-76 (2011).
82. Id. at 289.
83. Id. at 300.
84. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
85. Phillis, supra note 81, at 289-94. Phillis offers five policy concerns that she argues necessitate
changes to the existing structure: "(1 ) the encouragement of impulsive adolescent sexual behaviors; (2)
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current regime. 6 Ultimately, however, Phillis's proposal differs from my
proposed reforms, offered in Part VI. Although her licensure-style framework
rightfully seeks to link legal maturity with meaningful education, the plan's
reliance on states to design MCC status programs overlooks the wild
divergence in views on topics she labels objectively testable87 and ignores the
political infeasibility of mandating such a program with no opt-out provision.88
A proactive education and licensure program could have many benefits, but I
worry that, if subjected to similar pressures as existing sexual education
programs 89 and/or implemented poorly, it could provoke further societal
discord without substantive gains in knowledge. My suggested reforms work
toward an internal consistency that may be more palatable to larger segments of
a diverse constituency.
In the following Part, I discuss three possible arguments in favor of
maintaining the current structure of statutory rape and parental involvement
laws: conceiving of inconsistency as a form of collective compromise; as a
product of historical happenstance that does not necessarily require reform; and
as a justified expression of the uniqueness of the abortion decision as compared
to other significant and personal choices. I then discuss my arguments in favor
of changing the regime despite those status-quo arguments: the need to
preserve abortion access for minors; the impropriety of punishing otherwise
legal sexuality through abortion laws; and the stereotypically sexist messages
evinced by the current regime. In Part VI, I offer my preferred reforms, which
include aligning the ages at which minors may have legal sex and access
abortion, or at least creating a presumption in favor of finding "maturity" for
those above the age of consent.
the binding of decisional autonomy to pregnancy outcome; (3) the reinforcement of paternalistic gender
stereotypes; (4) the punitive, rather than protective, nature of parental involvement and judicial bypass;
and (5) the continued hystericization of adolescent sexuality." Id. at 276.
86. See infra Part V.
87. Phillis, supra note 81, at 305. The MCC exam would focus on "the emotional, psychological,
sociological, and physical consequences of sexual activity." Id. She notes that, rather than examining
cognitive ability or subjective moral standards, the test would address "substantive sexual and
reproductive knowledge. Topics for testing could include legal standards for consent, effective
contraceptive use, communication techniques for doctors, parents, and peers, STI transmission and
treatment, and reproductive options in the face of an unintended pregnancy." Id. Unfortunately, many of
these topics are in fact hotly debated, and views on what some may consider scientific facts are often
politically and/or religiously inflected.
88. Phillis, supra note 81, at 303.
89. See, e.g., Heather D. Boonstra, Advocates Call for a New Approach After the Era of
"Abstinence-Only" Sex Education, 12 GUTTMACHER POL'Y REV. 6 (2009),
https://www.guttmacher.org/pubs/gpr/12/l/gprl20106.pdf (discussing the role of politics and advocacy
in the rise of often medically inaccurate abstinence-only education programs); Amelie Meltzer, Sex,
Science, and Social Stigma: Why American Schools Fail at Sex Education, MORAL COMMUNITIES
PROJECT (May 4, 2015), http://moralcommunities.com/why-american-schools-fail-at-sex-education
(discussing the "polarized and politicized" debates around sex education).
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IV. POSSIBLE JUSTIFICATIONS FOR AGE DIFFERENTIALS
There are legitimate reasons why these laws should arguably not be
aligned, particularly given the difficulties of democracy, the statutes'
complicated and separate histories, and the unique implications of abortion.
Although I ultimately conclude that these reasons are outweighed by the
practical impacts on girls and the expressive effects of these laws in
combination, it is worth exploring arguments for retaining the current structure
in order to determine what we may be giving up or disrupting through reform.
A. "Inconsistency " Is a Useful Reflection ofSocietal Heterogeneity
What may appear to be an unjustified variance that counsels reform may
just be one of many instances where a complicated assemblage of civil and
criminal laws are not internally consistent. Apparent inconsistencies may not
necessitate a move to overarching explanatory theories; rather, the current
regime may be an example of what Cass Sunstein has termed "incompletely
theorized arguments." 90 This phenomenon explains circumstances in which
persons may be able to agree upon the "what," even while they have divergent
views on the "why." 91 Sunstein argues that "incompletely theorized judgments
are an important and valuable part of both private and public life. They help
make law possible; they even help make life possible." 92 Where society is
deeply divided on an issue, the most efficient and perhaps only way forward to
a tacit consensus may be to allow incongruity to exist, to not focus on it too
closely.
Sunstein discusses several merits of allowing these forms of compromise to
persist. He posits,
Most of [the virtues of incompletely theorized agreements] involve the
constructive uses of silence, an exceedingly important social and legal
phenomenon. Silence-on something that may prove false, obtuse, or
excessively contentious-can help minimize conflict, allow the present
to learn from the future, and save a great deal of time and expense.93
In this view, to reform would risk opening the issue to tumultuous scrutiny
by both sides and provoking disputes, perhaps without any ultimate
improvement. Also among the benefits described by Sunstein are "the
promotion of stability, the reduction of costs of disagreement, and the
demonstration of humility and mutual respect," all particularly important to the
90. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, LEGAL REASONING AND POLITICAL CONFLICT 4 (1996).
91. See id. at 5.
92. Id. at 39.
93. Id.
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formulation of agreement in a pluralistic society.94 This may very well be one
such case of deep societal division that would only be exacerbated by an
attempt to create a theoretically consistent result. Gallup's historical data on
trends in opinion on abortion indicate consistent divisions over the past several
decades.95 Although certain situations or proposals have garnered a greater
96
consensus from poll respondents, the polling population has remained starkly
split on other specifics and on broader questions of the legality and morality of
abortion. 9 7 Here, with regard to such personal and morally fraught subjects as
sex and abortion, allowing ages of consent to diverge from ages of abortion
may be beneficial.
Sunstein also notes that allowing agreements to go under-theorized creates
flexibility that may be useful in a forward-looking society. Thus, even if it were
possible to create a more specific result in the current moment, doing so may
hinder "moral evolution and progress over time."98 Where debate exists, one
side's success could risk "calcifying" one particular view of many. A modified
legal structure that is fully theorized "would be unable to accommodate
changes in facts or values." 99 According to this view, the collection of laws that
exists, while perhaps not ideal from the perspective of either side, is a form of
implicit compromise that allows a conflicted and multifarious society to persist
and evolve. To insist upon completely theorized legal regimes would not only
be practically difficult (if not impossible), but would also stir a great deal of
unrest as two or more conflicting visions seek to be fully or consistently
affirmed.
94. CASS R. SUNSTEIN, DESIGNING DEMOCRACY: WHAT CONSTITUTIONS Do 62 (2002).
95. Abortion, GALLUP, http://www.gallup.com/poll/1576/abortion.aspx (last visited May 17, 2016).
96. Examples include responses to questions on whether abortion should be legal when a woman's
physical health is endangered (in the most recent data, 82% said yes, 15% said no); whether abortion
should be legal when her life is endangered (83% said yes, 13% said no); whether respondent favors a
law requiring doctors to inform patients of risks prior to performing an abortion (87% favor, 11%
oppose); and whether he/she favors requiring doctors to inform patients of alternatives (88% favor, 11%
oppose). Id.
97. For example, in 2015 responses, pro-choice and pro-life camps were divided roughly in half
(49% or 50% classified themselves as pro-choice, and 44% considered themselves pro-life). Id. In May
2015, 45% of those responding said that they personally believed that abortion was generally morally
acceptable, 45% responded that they believed it was morally wrong, and 8% volunteered that it
depended on the situation. Id. Fifty-one percent of those polled believed that abortion should be legal
only under certain circumstances, whereas 29% believed that abortion should be legal under any
circumstances, and 19% believed that abortion should be illegal in all circumstances. Id (as of May
2015; polls have revealed a roughly consistent division of opinion over many years).
Looking toward reform, divisions in the public do not clearly indicate a way forward.
Respondents were asked whether they were "very satisfied, somewhat satisfied, somewhat dissatisfied,
or very dissatisfied" with the nation's policies on abortion. Those who responded that they were
dissatisfied were asked whether they "would like to see abortion laws in this country made more strict,
less strict, or remain as they are." In January 2015, 34% of those polled responded that they were
satisfied to some degree, 24% were dissatisfied and wanted stricter abortion laws, 12% were dissatisfied
and wanted laws to be less strict, 12% were dissatisfied and wished the laws to remain the same; and
18% had no opinion. Id.
98. SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 60.
99. Id.
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However, Sunstein's promotion of incompletely theorized agreements
raises the question of which cases are appropriate to leave vague. When should
compromise be prioritized and when is it important to engage in a struggle over
values? Sunstein acknowledges that "[w]hen people theorize, by raising the
level of abstraction, they do so to reveal bias, or confusion, or inconsistency"-
and they are sometimes successful in doing so.' He also notes that, although
social consensus is an important justification for permitting these vague
agreements to persist, it is not "a consideration that outweighs everything else.
Usually it would be much better to have a just outcome, rejected by many
people, than an unjust outcome with which all or most agree. A just
constitution is more important than an agreed-upon constitution."' 0 ' In the
context of minors, where protections and rights are in many cases limited and
where those limitations have time and again been accepted by our legal and
political system (we do not, for example, have uproars over tattoo restrictions
for minors), perhaps each side may decide to cede some ground and focus on
other fronts of the culture war. However, if the stakes are high enough for
minors and their rights, it may be worth devoting resources and accepting the
destabilization that may accompany increased focus. Even accepting the value
of Sunstein's "incompletely theorized agreements," we must still decide
whether the age gaps between statutory rape laws and parental involvement
laws are important for social cohesion or demand action.
B. The Laws Developed Separately, So May Not Require Alignment
The "inconsistency" we observe today may be nothing more insidious than
an artifact of divergent political and legal pressures over the course of
centuries. Passed at different times, by different state legislatures,1 02 and in
response to a variety of pressure groups, laws may often seem perplexingly
misaligned. However, this may not necessitate reform. Mismatches in ages at
which laws apply may simply be an overlooked result of historical
happenstance, a common result of a federalized, democratic system.
Viewed in one way, each law's goal is different. Statutory rape law
regulates and deems criminal the conduct not of teens but of those who engage
sexually with them. It was shaped by the concerns of parents and later by
feminists and those concerned with the costs associated with teen motherhood.
Parental involvement laws may be seen as an affirmation of family unity and an
assurance of informed consent by one with the proper capacities to make an
independent decision. A perspective that insists upon reading these laws
alongside one another is only one of several viewpoints and is unique to a
100. SUNSTEIN, supra note 90, at 38-39.
101. SUNSTEIN, supra note 94, at 65.
102. See infra Part 1.
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particular historical moment in which both sex and abortion can be envisioned
as linked along an axis of bodily autonomy.
As evidenced by the shifts in these laws' motivations over time, this has
not always been-and for many still is not-the way these laws are and should
be read. The fact of their current application may be merely coincidental; it
may not warrant changes to either or both so long as they function
independently on their objects. Whether they do so effectively, without unduly
harming those to whose conduct they apply, should determine our views on
whether this incidence of history should be allowed to remain.
C. Abortion Exceptionalism May Be Justified
A third argument accepts the distinctive treatment of abortion on the basis
that it is different. The perspective that is troubled by an inconsistency between
treatment of abortion and other decisions, the perspective that assumes their
comparability, is neither universally held nor necessarily correct. Many believe
that abortion possesses a unique moral dimension that is not present in other
medical decisions. Pro-life groups are particularly concerned with the third-
party harms that result from an abortion decision; this alone may justify
disparate treatment of abortion relative to other procedures or choices.
This treatment is not unprecedented. The Supreme Court has implicitly
accepted this differentiation in several cases, allowing the abortion decision to
be singled out for additional burdens. 10 3 The Danforth'0 Court, ignoring
plaintiffs' arguments that Missouri allowed minors to consent to other
significant medical decisions, left open the possibility that a less intrusive
parental consent law would be acceptable.tos In Bellotti I,106 the Court
remanded a Massachusetts parental consent law that existed alongside a newly
enacted law that granted minors "considerable medical self-consent rights,"
excluding abortion. 107 The Court declined to consider the issue of
"impermissible distinction" until the state courts had interpreted the statute on
remand.1 0 8 Upon second review in Bellotti I,109 the Court did ultimately
invalidate the law, but without attention to the differential treatment of teens
seeking to terminate their pregnancies versus those carrying to term or making
other medical decisions.110 Even in these cases, where plaintiffs directly
103. J. Shoshanna Ehrlich, Grounded in the Reality of Their Lives: Listening to Teens Who Make
the Abortion Decision Without Involving Their Parents, 1 8 BERKELEY J. GENDER L. & JUST. 61, 79-87
(2013).
104. Planned Parenthood of Central Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52 (1976).
105. Ehrlich, supra note 103, at 80-81.
106. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1), 428 U.S. 132 (1976).
107. Ehrlich, supra note 103, at 82.
108. Id. at 83; Bellotti 1, 428 U.S. at 149.
109. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622 (1979).
110. Ehrlich, supra note 103, at 84-85.
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problematized the contrast between minors' abortion rights and other rights to
consent, the Court has allowed opponents to target abortion.
Abortion has also received particularized attention in lawmaking beyond
statutes restricting minors. States have singled out abortion to institute various
forms of restrictions applicable to adult women and medical providers."' This
case law is potentially in flux,112 but as it currently stands, such differential
treatment persists in many states. The promotion and frequently successful
passage of these laws, without a similar push in other arenas of law regulating
minors or medical practice, indicates the prevalence of this view on abortion.
When abortion appears to be a moral rather than medical concern, its
legality and commonness may justify, even demand, targeted attention.
Assuming this, the current regime that allows teens to have sex and make other
decisions but imposes burdens on the abortion decision is not a problem. The
"inconsistency" rather reflects the unique moral heft of the abortion decision.
As with many cases in which morality blends with the secular legal, however,
the question becomes whether and when it is proper for one view of abortion to
dictate the accessibility of the procedure.
V. REASONS THE AGES OF ABORTION AND OF SEXUAL CONTACT
SHOULD BE ALIGNED
Notwithstanding any value in the above arguments, the age at which a
minor can obtain an abortion without involving her parents should be aligned
with the age at which she can have legal sex. The reasons underlying and
bolstering the current regime are not strong enough to justify constraining
111. See, e.g., State Policies in Brief An Overview of Abortion Law GUTEMACHER INST. (Jan. 1,
2016), https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOAL.pdf (indicating the prevalence of various
abortion-specific laws, including funding restrictions and mandated counseling language); State Policies
in Brief Targeted Regulation of Abortion Providers, GUTTMACHER INST. (Jan. 1, 2016),
https://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibTRAP.pdf (outlining regulations imposed on
abortion facilities and providers).
Several courts have flagged this tactic of targeting abortions. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood
Arizona, Inc. v. Humble, 753 F.3d 905, 915 (9th Cir.) (noting that a law requiring doctors to prescribe
abortion medication in accordance with FDA protocols deviated from the typical expectations of off-
label use in medical practice), cert. denied, 135 S. Ct. 870 (2014); Nova Health Sys. v. Pruitt, 292 P.3d
28, as corrected (Dec. 5, 2012) (affirming a lower court's decision to strike down a mandatory
ultrasound law that was focused specifically on those connected with abortion rather than with other
procedures); Planned Parenthood of the Heartland, Inc. v. Iowa Bd. of Med., 865 N.W.2d 252, 269
(Iowa 2015) ("The Board appears to hold abortion to a different medical standard than other
procedures.").
112. The Supreme Court has agreed to hear Whole Woman's Health v. Cole, 136 S. Ct. 499 (2015)
(granting certiorari), a challenge to a restriction on abortion providers that does not apply to providers of
other medical procedures. Judge Posner of the Seventh Circuit recently struck down a similar law, in
part on the grounds that it singled out abortion for requirements not applied to other doctors or
providers. Planned Parenthood of Wis. v. Schimel, 806 F.3d 908, 914 (7th Cir. 2015) ("No other
procedure performed outside a hospital, even one as invasive as a surgical abortion, is required by
Wisconsin law to be performed by doctors who have admitting privileges at hospitals within a specified
radius of where the procedure is performed.").
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access. These laws' practical and expressive effects, as elaborated in this Part,
demand reform.
A. Abortion Access Must be Preserved for Otherwise Mature Minors
Minors who are "in the gap"-above the age of legal sex but still not able
to obtain an abortion-should not be deprived agency and choice on the basis
that they apparently only meet one standard of maturity but not another.
Consider the following example:
Jane, a seventeen-year-old girl in Tennessee, is in a sexual relationship
with her eighteen-year-old partner, John. Jane has been on hormonal birth
control prescribed by her doctor for the past year, but due to imperfect usage,
she becomes pregnant. Jane has not had contact with her mother since she was
a young child, and her relationship with her father is strained. He regularly
makes derogatory comments about "slutty" girls and "irresponsible teen
moms." Jane does not know how her father would react if she were to tell him
about her pregnancy, but she knows that he will be disappointed in her and is
concerned that he may turn violent. In Tennessee, a person over thirteen can
legally have sexual intercourse with a partner who is no more than four years
older than her,'13 so Jane and John's sexual relationship is legal. Jane has never
been legally restricted from obtaining contraceptives 1 4 and STI testing' 5
without her father's knowledge. Faced with a positive pregnancy test, however,
she has been told by her health care provider that, because she is under
eighteen, she cannot obtain an abortion without her father's permission unless
she goes through a process called "judicial bypass" to get approval from a
judge."'6 This process involves taking time off from school, traveling to the
courthouse, and facing a judge who will ask probing questions about her
grades, her relationships with her parents and boyfriend, her decision-making
process, and possibly her sexual or romantic history. Knowing that her sexual
relationship was legal and having faced no barriers to accessing other forms of
healthcare, Jane was unaware of this requirement and feels unprepared for the
choice between two daunting options: telling her disapproving father or going
through the court system (itself not a guarantee). She delays her decision
several weeks and her pregnancy enters the second trimester, in which the
113. Glosser et al., supra note 61, at 107 (citing TENN. CODE ANN. § 39-13-506 (2012)).
114. State Policies in Brief An Overview of Minors' Consent Law, GUrMACHER INST. (Mar. 1,
2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibOMCL.pdf [hereinafter Overview of Minors'
Consent Law]; State Policies in Brief Minors' Access to Contraceptive Services, GUTfMACHER INST.
(Mar. 1, 2016), http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib MACS.pdf
115. Overview of Minors' Consent Law, supra note 114; State Policies in Brief Minors'Access to
STI Services, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spibMASS.pdf
116. Overview of Minors' Consent Law, supra note 114; Parental Involvement in Minors'
Abortions, supra note 58.
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health risks of abortion are higher.' "7 If Jane were to decide to carry her
pregnancy to term, none of these conditions would apply; in Tennessee, a
minor can gain access to prenatal care without informing a parent." 8 Having
given birth, Jane may also, without the consent of her father, make the decision
to place the child for adoption."'9 Caught in the middle of this matrix of laws,
Jane possesses an autonomous decisional ability in the contexts of
contraception, STI testing, and childbirth, but she cannot access an abortion.
The law has deemed her mature enough to carry to term and either raise the
child or give the child up for adoption. Jane has control over her body only
conditionally, and her available paths forward are limited once she becomes
pregnant. The law recognizes Jane's capacity to consent to sexual contact and
grants her nearly all of the tools to address the consequences of that sexual
contact-except abortion.
Parental involvement laws have been justified on several grounds.1 20 First,
the Court has considered this to be one of many contexts in which a parent's
right to have input in their children's lives must be weighed.12' Second, courts
have determined that children benefit from parental guidance in a way that
contributes to a state interest in the welfare of minors.122 Third, the state has
recognized an interest in the cohesion and health of the "family unit."l 23 These
117. See Rex, supra note 71, at 112-13.
118. Overview of Minors' Consent Law, supra note 114; Parental Involvement in Minors'
Abortions, supra note 58.
119. Overview of Minors' Consent Law, supra note 114; State Policies in Brief Minors'Rights as
Parents, GUTTMACHER INST. (Mar. 1, 2016),
http://www.guttmacher.org/statecenter/spibs/spib_MRP.pdf.
120. See Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S. 417, 444 (1990) ("Three separate but related interests-
the interest in the welfare of the pregnant minor, the interest of the parents, and the interest of the family
unit-are relevant to our consideration of the constitutionality of the [parental involvement law in
question]."). The Court in Hodgson did not articulate a majority position on this issue, but multiple
separate opinions acknowledged the various interests at stake.
121. See Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 938 (1992) (Blackmun, J.,
concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and dissenting in part) ("[T]he State has an
interest in encouraging parental involvement in the minor's abortion decision . . . ."); Hodgson, 497 U.S.
at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in part) (citing H.L. v. Matheson,
450 U.S. 398, 409-11 (1981); and Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti 1l), 443 U.S. 622, 640-41 (1979))
("Protection of the right of each parent to participate in the upbringing of her or his own children is a
further discrete interest that the State recognizes by the statute. The common law historically has given
recognition to the right of parents, not merely to be notified of their children's actions, but to speak and
act on their behalf.").
122. See Casey, 505 U.S. at 895 ("Those enactments [of parental involvement laws], and our
judgment that they are constitutional, are based on the quite reasonable assumption that minors will
benefit from consultation with their parents and that children will often not realize that their parents have
their best interests at heart."); Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 483 (Kennedy, J., concurring in judgment in part
and dissenting in part) ("Age is a rough but fair approximation of maturity and judgment, and a State has
an interest in seeing that a child, when confronted with serious decisions such as whether or not to abort
a pregnancy, has the assistance of her parents in making the choice. If anything is settled by our previous
cases dealing with parental notification and consent laws, it is this point.").
123. Hodgson, 497 U.S. at 484 (Kennedy, J., concurring in the judgment in part and dissenting in
part) ("A State pursues a legitimate end under the Constitution when it attempts to foster and preserve
the parent-child relationship by giving all parents the opportunity to participate in the care and nurture of
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interests have been held to be legitimate bases for requiring parental
involvement in a minors' abortion decision, given a presumption that young
persons' "immaturity, inexperience, and lack of judgment may sometimes
impair their ability to exercise their rights wisely."' 2 4 Examining these
arguments more closely, however, makes clear that there is little, if any, reason
to restrict abortion when the minor is otherwise deemed mature.
With respect to a right of parental input, abortion is an outlier among
critical sex- and reproduction-related decisions made by minors. As the
Tennessee example illustrates, minors are granted autonomy in other
contexts-including several alternatives to abortion-earlier than the age at
which they can access an abortion without parental involvement.1 2 5 Malinda L.
Seymore offers several examples to highlight the inconsistency of the current
consent regimes for minors:
[I]n the vast majority of states, a pregnant minor can go through labor
and delivery without her parents knowing. A pregnant minor can also
relinquish her parental rights in order to place that child for adoption
without her parents knowing. In fact, in all but fifteen states, a minor
can make the consequential decision of voluntarily terminating her
parental rights without the advice of legal counsel, without a guardian
ad litem representing her interests, and without any adult in the room
other than the representative of an adoption agency or adoptive
parents. By contrast, in the vast majority of states, a pregnant minor
cannot terminate her pregnancy without her parents knowing, unless a
judge approves.1 26
Relatedly, although most states have implemented laws requiring minors to
receive approval to terminate a pregnancy, parental "guidance" has not been
deemed so critical for other significant and related choices. In fact, many of
those parental-involvement states have explicitly granted minors the right to
consent to other serious medical and personal decisions.127 It is not evident why
a minor deemed mature enough to make all of those decisions is in such need
of guidance and input in her abortion decision that legislatures may force her to
navigate significant emotional and logistical obstacles to access the procedure.
Further, there is no indication that parental involvement betters the minors'
their children. We have held that parents have a liberty interest, protected by the Constitution, in having
a reasonable opportunity to develop close relations with their children.").
124. Id. at 444-45 (Stevens, J.) (citing Bellotti II, 443 U.S. at 634-39 (1979); and Prince v.
Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158, 166-67 (1944)).
125. See Overview ofMinors' Consent Law, supra note 114.
126. Seymore, supra note 77, at 101-02; see also Bonny, supra note 32, at 329-30 (highlighting
several contexts in which minors are given the freedom to make decisions without parental involvement,
including giving birth, obtaining prenatal care and STD treatment, and giving a child up for adoption.).
127. See Bonny, supra note 32, at 329-30.
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decision or familial bonds.128 Indeed, as in Jane's case, mandating parental
involvement in abortion decisions may negatively affect the family unit.1 2 9
Minors' relative inexperience also fails to provide a legitimate reason for
denying them independence in the abortion context. Although in some cases
minors are only gradually granted full access to the rights and liberties afforded
to adults,1 3 0 such differential treatment is not justified for minors in the gap
between ages of consent and parental involvement laws. 131 The current parental
involvement law regime restricts the rights of these minors in a way that would
be impermissible if applied to adult women. This is not per se improper; the
Court has indeed "acknowledged that states may restrict the rights of minors in
ways that would be unconstitutional if applied to adults." 32 However, states'
reasoning for doing so is less persuasive where those minors are deemed
capable of deciding to carry to term or putting their child up for adoption, and
regulation must be warranted by important interests. "Although the Court 'has
recognized that the State has somewhat broader authority to regulate the
activities of children than of adults,' the State nevertheless must demonstrate
that there is a 'Significant state interest in conditioning an abortion . . . that is
not present in the case of an adult."'"33 This "significant state interest" is surely
not present if a minor is allowed to make so many other comparably complex
and permanent choices upon discovering a pregnancy.
As Scarnecchia and Field note, the inverse of the Court's differential
treatment of minors is that "[a] pregnant minor who is mature enough to make
128. "Not only does '[n]o evidence exist[] that legislation mandating parental involvement against
the adolescent's wishes has any added benefit in improving productive family communication,'
evidence alternatively tends to show that 'such legislation may have an adverse impact on some
families."' Rex, supra note 71, at 112 (discussing empirical evidence of the potential detrimental effects
of parental involvement laws on children seeking abortions).
129. Id.
130. The Court has compared parental involvement laws to consent requirements imposed on
minors seeking an "operation, marrying, or entering military service." Hodgson v. Minnesota, 497 U.S.
417, 444-45 (1990). However, other opinions have acknowledged the "peculiar nature of the abortion
decision," which necessitates a more flexible form of regulation than the bright line age cutoffs used in
other contexts. Bellotti v. Baird (Bellotti II), 443 U.S. 622, 643-44 n.23 (1979) (opinion of Powell, J.).
As Suellyn Scarnecchia and Julie Kunce Field summarize:
Justice Powell is referring to the fact that a state may arbitrarily set an age that defines
maturity for various rights and privileges, such as marriage, where the risk of requiring a
mature minor to wait until she reaches the age of majority is relatively low. On the other
hand, the urgency of the abortion decision requires an immediate determination of the
minor's maturity: she cannot simply wait until she is eighteen and have the abortion at that
time.
Scamecchia & Field, supra note 42, at 79.
131. See Hodgson, 497 U.S. 4at 435 ("Thus, the constitutional protection against unjustified state
intrusion into the process of deciding whether or not to bear a child extends to pregnant minors as well
as adult women."); Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 428 U.S. 52, 74 (1976)
("Constitutional rights do not mature and come into being magically only when one attains the state-
defined age of majority."); see also Bellotti 11, 443 U.S. at 633 (plurality opinion) ("A child, merely on
account of his minority, is not beyond the protection of the Constitution.").
132. Scamecchia & Field, supra note 42, at 78 (citing Bellotti 1, 443 U.S. at 635-39).
133. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 938 (1992) (citing Danforth, 428 U.S.
at 74-75).
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the decision on her own is deserving of the same constitutional protection
available to an adult woman."l34 This allowance should apply not just to those
who prove their maturity through a judicial bypass proceeding, but also extend
to those who have already been deemed mature enough to opt for an alternative
choice.
In sum, the proffered justifications for parental involvement laws ring
hollow for minors above the age of consent. Given the similarity between other
mature minor laws and the abortion decision, the interests that encourage
parental involvement for this limited segment of teens-who are authorized to
have sex but not terminate a pregnancy-are weak. Even assuming that
parental rights are strong enough to authorize parental involvement laws for
some minors, the weakened interest in regulating minors who are deemed
mature in comparable contexts is not adequate to permit the law to infringe
upon their right to abortion.
B. Minors Should Not Be Punished for Legal Sex
However coincidental the convergence of abortion and statutory rape laws,
the mismatch of their age boundaries constrains the lawful sexuality of teens.
States effectively punish young girls who opt to engage in sexual activity
before the age at which they can independently terminate a resulting pregnancy.
Applied together, these laws simultaneously grant legal approval to teens'
sexual conduct and obstruct efforts to obtain an abortion. Even if a teen is
ultimately able to access the procedure through either parental involvement or a
judicial bypass, the law subjects her to per se-unwanted attention, scrutiny, and
judgment. As several authors have argued, the process required by the laws
serves as punishment in and of itself
A teenager confronting an unwanted pregnancy must, in most states,
determine whether she will discuss the pregnancy with her parent(s) or seek a
waiver from a judge. Those who are unwilling or unable to speak with their
parent(s) 135 must prepare for a court hearing. With a time-sensitive procedure
like abortion, the bypass process also imposes medical risks, presenting a
physical concern in addition to other social and economic concerns.' 36
Although the bypass process is constitutionally required to be conducted
134. Scamecchia & Field, supra note 42, at 78 (emphasis added).
135. Teens may opt not to notify their parents for any number of reasons, including fear of abuse or
rejection, of revealing sexual activity or a sexual partner, and of disappointing the adults in their lives.
See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 34, at 311.
136. See Rex, supra note 71, at 112 (noting the advice of the American Medical Association and
Pediatrics Association); Sanger, supra note 34, at 310 (citing the agreement among the AMA, the
American College of Obstetricians and Gynecologists, and the American Academy of Pediatricians that
the judicial bypass system leads to problematic delays).
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speedily,' 37 requesting a bypass and (if applicable) appealing a denial
necessarily entails delay.' 38 That delay may have medical consequences,
forcing an eventual abortion to be performed at a later stage of pregnancy,
during which more invasive and riskier methods are more likely to be
necessary. 1 If a delay is too severe, the pregnancy may progress past when a
legal abortion may be performed. Even in an expedited process, the delays of
the legal system (or deliberation about whether to resort to the legal waiver)
involve physical risks.
Further, minors face logistical barriers often stemming from adult oversight
and a lack of financial independence.1 40 Teens must typically find a way to take
time off from school to attend a hearing and discreetly travel to and from the
courthouse.141 With narrow exceptions, anonymity is constitutionally required,
but the practical reality of the process may still threaten teens' privacy.1 42 Once
in the hearing itself, a young woman is required to divulge intimate information
to evidence her decision-making capacity and the need to waive parental
involvement:
Bypass petitioners must testify as to the most private matters in a
teenage life: the fact of sexual intercourse; the predicament of
pregnancy; the structure or disarray of home life that makes her
believe she should not involve her parents; her views on motherhood;
her success (or not) in life so far; and her idea of her future.1 43
These judicial inquiries, intended to probe "maturity" and the propriety of
abortion in the case at hand,'" are a "significant intrusion" into a minor's
private life by an authoritative and intimidating figure. 145 There are numerous
anecdotes in which a young woman was denied an abortion because a judge
137. See Bellotti v. Baird, 443 U.S. 622, 644 (1979) ("[Bypass hearings] must assure that a
resolution of the issue, and any appeals that may follow, will be completed with anonymity and
sufficient expedition to provide an effective opportunity for an abortion to be obtained."); Sanger, supra
note 71, at 426, 428-29; Sanger, supra note 34, at 309.
138. Sanger, supra note 34, at 311.
139. Id.at311.
140. These difficulties compound the challenges teens face in going through with the abortion
procedure, which also requires time and resources to obtain.
141. See Sanger, supra note 71, at 426-28; Sanger, supra note 34, at 309.
142. See Sanger, supra note 34, at 309.
143. Id. at 311-12.
144. See Sanger, supra note 71, at 429-30 ("Bypass judges are charged with resolving two basic
questions. The first is whether the petitioning minor has proven that she is mature and informed enough
to make an abortion decision. If the judge finds that she has, he must grant her petition. If the judge finds
that she has not, then he must resolve a second question: even if the minor's decisional competence is
lacking, is an abortion nonetheless in her best interest?"); see also Bonny, supra note 32, at 322 ("State
courts have measured 'maturity' in a variety of ways. In evaluating a pregnant minor's maturity, courts
have examined factors such as the minor's age, academic performance, intellectual capacity,
participation in extracurricular activities at school, plans for the future, and the ability to handle her own
finances.").
145. See Sanger, supra note 34, at 312.
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deemed her answers inadequate according to his subjective standard-
regardless of how thoroughly a teen had reflected upon the implications of her
decision.1 46 Scarnecchia and Field raised concerns with the degree of discretion
granted to judges in these hearings: "Appearing before judges who hear
parental consent cases subjects minor girls to the individual beliefs of those
judges. This level of judicial discretion poses threats to the petitioning minor
even greater than might be expected." 47
Although the potential for judicial abuse is concerning, the typical outcome
of hearings is not the biggest "red flag" of the bypass process. It appears that,
"[a]mbiguous legal standards and potential unworkability aside, filed bypass
petitions are almost always approved." 48 Instead, it is the procedure outlined
above that has been the locus of critique by many of those involved with the
bypass process. Carol Sanger has argued,
[I]njustice attaches even to the 'successful' cases where the petition is
granted.... [T]he hearings themselves-and not just their outcomes-
are an improper use of law. For whatever the disposition of the
petition, all minors who fear telling their parents about their pregnancy
or their decision to abort must participate in the bypass hearing
process, a process that creates its own set of harms.1 49
Forced participation in the process itself is viewed as the untenable burden
on pregnant teens. 50 Fears for safety, the intimidation of inserting the legal into
the medical realm, and the risk of being publicly shamed or harassed are the
true burdens imposed by these laws. In some states, authorization is becoming
less certain and the risks attendant to bypass proceedings more severe. In 2014,
Alabama's legislature passed H.B. 494, which, among other newly burdensome
provisions, allows hearings to be transformed into adversarial proceedings.
Texas' H.B. 3994, which took effect January 1, 2016, amended the state's
judicial bypass procedures to add additional obstacles to accessing abortion
efficiently and anonymously.1 52
146. See, e.g., Sanger, supra note 71, at 486; Sanger, supra note 34, at 310; id. at 312; Scamecchia
& Field, supra note 42, at 90-91.
147. Scarnecchia & Field, supra note 42, at 86.
148. Rex, supra note 71, at 121; see Oberman, supra note 74, at 52 (referring to judicial bypass
hearings as "largely a 'rubber stamp' process"); Sanger, note 34, at 309.
149. Sanger, supra note 34, at 310.
150. Rex, supra note 71, at 121 (citing common acceptance among professionals of Sanger's
"process as punishment" perspective).
151. ALA. CODE § 26-21-4 (West 2015). The new law calls for the involvement of the district
attorney, who may examine the petitioner and any witnesses and request a delay. Id. at § 26-21-4(i), (k).
It also provides, "In the court's discretion, it may appoint a guardian ad litem for the interests of the
unborn child of the petitioner who shall also have the same rights and obligations of participation in the
proceeding as given to the district attorney's office." Id. at § 26-21-4(j).
152. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 33.003 (West 2015). The Guttmacher Institute offered this summary
of Texas' amended law:
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Sanger has further focused on the intentionality of these process burdens.
Classifying the judicial bypass process as "a unique and rather clever form of
punishment," 53 she has focused not on the "humiliation or harassment that is
incidental to a process but rather [on] the intentional use of legal process to
punish in cases where the petitioner has committed no legal wrong." 54 In this
view, the psychological and logistical burdens to which minors are subjected
are not an unfortunate side effect of an otherwise well-intentioned law-they
are rather the very purpose of the law. She argues, "Parental involvement
statutes have little to do with improving the quality of a minor's decision and
much to do with dissuading her from abortion and punishing her if she
proceeds."'5 5 While typically framed in terms of parental rights, familial unity,
and child protection, these laws are a means to pursue a particular agenda, "a
set of political goals aimed at thwarting abortion, restoring parental authority,
and punishing girls for having sex." 56
Through parental involvement laws, anti-abortion groups accomplish or
seek to accomplish several goals through this one blunt method. Where the
process intimidates a girl out of seeking an abortion or delays her until beyond
when an abortion would be feasible, they succeed in limiting the number of
abortions performed. However, given the generally small number of girls who
rely on this process and the relative infrequency of denials, the deterrent effect
does not explain why this particular type of law is so popular.' 57 Instead, the
true appeal of these statutes is the assertion of control over female sexuality. 58
They "serve to reassert a form of legal authority over the sexual behavior of
daughters that was more clearly under parental control."l59 Where minors are
forced to go through the hearings, they must confront-implicitly, or perhaps
In June, Gov. Greg Abbott (R) signed a bill that amends the legal process through which a
minor may obtain a court order to waive the state's parental consent requirement. Under the
new requirements, the minor can file for a judicial bypass only in a court in her county of
residence and must appear at the court in person. The law also requires the court to follow a
stricter standard of evidence and use specific criteria when weighing the petition.
Furthermore, the court has five business days to issue judgment, instead of two and if a
judgment is not rendered within the time frame, the petition is denied. The court is permitted
to order a mental health evaluation of the minor and examine her familiarity with state-
published counseling materials. Also, the law requires all women seeking an abortion to
provide government-issued identification. If a woman cannot provide identification that
proves she is an adult, she must be treated as a minor and must obtain parental consent. The
law takes effect in 2016.
Major Developments in Sexual & Reproductive Health, supra note 5.
153. Sanger, supra note 34, at 312.
154. Id.
155. Id. at 315.
156. Id. at 306.
157. GALLUP, supra note 95 (reporting the results of a question asking for opinions on "a law
requiring women under 18 to get parental consent for any abortion," to which 71% said that they favored
such a law, 27% opposed, and 2% had no opinion, in July 2011).
158. Sanger, supra note 34, at 314 (noting that the "process as punishment" theory helps to explain
the popularity of parental involvement requirements despite the low number of petitions that are actually
denied).
159. Id. at 313.
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explicitly, from a judge or a parent-hostility or disapproval of their actions.
This is true even when other statutes deem their behavior legally acceptable.
The sheer fact that a minor must be instructed by a provider or legal advocate
that a judicial bypass proceeding is necessary informs her that an abortion
decision is "serious," "risky," and perhaps beyond her capacity to comprehend
independently. In any or all of these ways, young people are being punished
and harmed emotionally, mentally, and maybe physically.
The procedural obstacles are arguably particularly concerning when
imposed upon those in the "gap" -teenagers who have been deemed mature
enough to have sex but must still be subjected to these judicial bypass burdens.
For this specific population, laws do not prevent sex or pregnancies from
occurring, but rather only function to assure that young people are not
guaranteed "consequence-free" sex. Teens may understandably receive the
message, and must deal with the practical reality, that-even if extramarital sex
is legally sanctioned-their sex warrants punishment. The burdens and risks
inherent to sexual activity are made more severe by laws that restrict the
options of legally consenting minors.
These laws implicitly impose moralistic views of sexual conduct; girls who
engage in even legal sex must seek approval before terminating a pregnancy.
Additional process is imposed to complete what statutory rape law does only
partially: control and punish extra-marital (and particularly non-procreative)
sexuality. Placing so many obstacles in front of those seeking to address the
consequences of legal sex has concerning effects. These laws inform teens that,
although they may legally have sex, they are not free to have sex; the law still
has a role in punishing such behavior, and courts have affirmed that role as
legitimate.
C. The Current Regime Expresses a Bias Toward Stereotypical Roles
In addition to the impact on the practical choices of teens, these laws in
combination, have a particular expressive value. Even if applied neutrally, the
structure of these laws sends a mixed message to those "in the gap" that
expresses preferences for traditional feminine roles and assumptions about the
capacity of women. The laws' asymmetry-placing obstacles in front of
female-bodied persons seeking abortion but not those planning to carry to
term-reinforces particular narrow understandings of gender roles. Regardless
of the intent of legislators who crafted each of the laws independently, the
coalescence of these laws has the effect of paving paths to certain choices while
expressing ambivalence toward others. Young women are free to become
parents without any adult oversight, but are not permitted to independently
delay or opt out of motherhood. By rendering certain choices more difficult,
these laws may be interpreted as expressing a presumption that certain choices
[Vol. 28:171198
Note: Mind the Gap
are inherently valid and valued, whereas others must be "earned" by persuading
an outside party that one is fit to make the decision. This inconsistency sends
messages to minors and illustrates American society's equivocal relationship to
non-marital sexuality. For those teenagers who can legally consent to sexual
contact but not abortion, procreative sex is implicitly accepted, whereas the
termination of a resulting pregnancy is labeled as fraught and problematic.
With these laws, states effectively put their evaluative force behind certain
roles: those that fit stereotypical molds of womanhood and femininity.
The notion that the law may carry expressive weight in addition to its
actual constraints on persons is widely discussed.160 Substantive due process
jurisprudence and the extension of protections to marginalized groups are
largely founded on this premise. Central to the Supreme Court's decision in
Brown v. Board of Education was its determination that a "feeling of inferiority
as to [Black children's] status in the community" resulted from de jure
segregation.161 The Court stressed that "[t]he impact [of the detrimental effect
on children] is greater when it has the sanction of the law." 62 Sixty years later,
the Supreme Court again discussed stigmatic harm and the importance of legal
and societal recognition in the context of same-sex relationships. 6 3 Justice
Kennedy wrote for the Obergefell majority: "[When] sincere, personal
opposition becomes enacted law and public policy, the necessary consequence
is to put the imprimatur of the State itself on an exclusion that soon demeans or
stigmatizes those whose own liberty is then denied."'" These opinions assert
the law's capacity to communicate meaning. They declare and operate with the
understanding that the law's embrace can exalt conduct and statuses, that its
rebuke can degrade others.
In the case of parental involvement and statutory rape laws, the expressive
value stems not simply from a single law's treatment of a class of persons, but
from the interaction of different legal regimes. The state's bias'6 5 toward one
type of action is highlighted when one form of law is directly contrasted with a
different, parallel law's treatment of an alternative action. For instance,
although thirty-eight states require parental involvement in a minor's abortion
160. See, e.g., Joel Feinberg, The Expressive Function of Punishment, 49 MONIST 397, 401 (1965)
("That the expression of the community's condemnation is an essential ingredient in legal punishment is
widely acknowledged by legal writers."); Cass R. Sunstein, On the Expressive Function of Law, 144 U.
PA. L. REV. 2021, 2024 (1996) (discussing the "expressive function of law-the function of law in
'making statements' as opposed to controlling behavior directly").
161. Brown v. Bd. of Educ. of Topeka, 347 U.S. 483, 494 (1954).
162. Id. (quoting findings from the court below).
163. Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2600-02 (2015).
164. Id. at 2602.
165. Of course, examining the motivations of "the state" is complicated by the many inputs and
forces that construct statutes' content. However, it is worth noting the expressive capacity of the law
when examined as a frozen cross-section. At the very least, these laws still exist, and regardless of intent
upon passage, lawmakers have not since questioned the entrenched assumptions about women's roles.
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decision,'66 similar interventions are not generally required for decisions about
prenatal care. Forty-five states either explicitly allow minors to consent to
prenatal medical care or do not have a related policy. 16 7 In those thirty-eight
states with enforceable statutes limiting abortion access, thirty-three allow all
minors to independently consent to prenatal care.' 68 In many states, young
women may independently opt to become mothers and make medical decisions
attendant to that choice, but, should they decide to seek an abortion, must go to
court for permission from an outside power. Ehrlich discusses how, "in states
with parental involvement laws, a young woman most likely will be able to
embrace, but not to reject, motherhood on her own. The law treats her as
competent to make one, but not the other, decision without adult
involvement."' 6 9 A girl permitted to legally have sex and carry a pregnancy to
term can accept a traditionally feminine maternal role, but should she attempt
to reject that role, the state puts outside authorities in a decisional position on
her behalf. Minors are deemed to benefit from input when bucking
stereotypical roles, but not otherwise-perhaps suggesting that the maternal
role and procreation are so natural that the state should automatically grant
permission.
The regulation of youth on the cusp of adulthood is a particularly intriguing
place to focus. Although privacy concerns and case law have placed some adult
conduct beyond the law's control, minors have remained permissible targets of
regulation. Laws regulating minors may become the hub of people's anxieties
toward what we believe should be present in our society more generally. That
which is declared inappropriate for those near adulthood is only reluctantly
allowable adult behavior. As Malinda Seymore notes, the differential treatment
of abortion-as compared to other significant decisions left to minors-points
to the goals underlying parental involvement laws.' 70 Promoted by advocacy
groups devoted to a broader anti-abortion agenda, parental involvement laws
are only one arm of a legal strategy that seeks to chip away at the abortion
right.171 One leading group, the Americans United for Life (AUL), took an
166. See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
167. See Overview of Minors' Consent Law, supra note 114, at 1. Thirteen of these states allow, but
do not require a doctor to notify a minor's parents. Id. The remaining four states that do not allow all
minors to consent allow some minors to consent under certain conditions. Id.
168. See id. at 2. This number combines both those states that explicitly allow all minors age
seventeen and under to consent (of which there are twenty-three) and those states that do not have any
relevant policies or case law and thus allow minors to consent by default (of which there are ten). Eight
of those thirty-three permit physicians to inform a minor's parents, although they are not required to do
so. Id.
169. Ehrlich, supra note 103, at 146. Ehrlich explores the "absurdity of linking decisional capacity
to the pregnancy outcome." Id. at 147.
170. Seymore, supra note 77, at 102-03.
171. See Jeanne Cummings, In Abortion Fight, Little-Known Group Has Guiding Hand, WALL ST.
J. (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SBl13331435902109731 ("Americans United's step-
by-step approach set several targets. They included pushing provisions in state abortion laws to
recognize and protect unborn children such as mandating a second physician be assigned to treat the
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incremental approach toward overturning Roe v. Wade that included promoting,
and then defending in court, various abortion restrictions bearing on the lives of
both minors and adult women. 172 AUL's model language was successfully
incorporated into more than thirty states' parental-notification laws as of
2004.173 As part of a larger anti-choice strategy, parental involvement laws
align more closely with abortion restrictions imposed upon adult women than
other laws relating to minors' consent. 174 Seymore asserts, "The real purpose of
parental consent and notification statutes is not to promote informed
decisionmaking by vulnerable minors, but to discourage abortion altogether-
part of a larger strategy to end abortion.... [These statutes are] a curtailment of
women's autonomy in sexual and reproductive matters."'75 The combined
application of these laws creates a regime that permits sexual contact and
allows private decision-making in some arenas while constraining autonomy in
others, demonstrating ambivalence about (female) sexuality.
Many have brought attention to American society's uncertain orientation
toward sexuality; sexualized images are ubiquitous even as non-monogamous
or non-procreative sexuality are scorned. The comparative ages at which
actions are permitted may be seen as an imperfect heuristic for a society's
feelings toward those actions. The variability in age permissions within and
among states may illustrate tensions and disagreements around sexual behavior
(or at least views on who may appropriately engage in that behavior). Through
constraints on teens' choices, the laws express a broader preference for sex-
with-consequences and for the linkage of sex with procreation. Teens' relative
vulnerability and pliability permits the state to regulate their lives in a way that
would be deemed too intrusive if applied to adults.1 77 For example, whereas the
constitutionality of parental involvement laws is "based on the quite reasonable
assumption that minors will benefit from consultation with their parents and
that children will often not realize that their parents have their best interests at
fetus in late-term abortions. The group sought expansion of parental rights in cases of minors-first
pressing for parental notification and then pushing for a parental consent. And it helped pass 24-hour




175. Seymore, supra note 77, at 102-03.
176. See, e.g., Michelle Oberman, Regulating Consensual Sex with Minors: Defining a Role for
Statutory Rape, 48 BUFF. L. REv. 703, 715 (2000) ("When it comes to issues of sexuality, in spite of
several decades of sexual 'liberation,' including effective contraception and legalized abortion, this
remains a society rife with sexual double-standards."); Harriet F. Pilpel, Sex vs. the Law: A Study in
Hypocrisy, HARPER'S MAGAZINE, Jan. 1965, at 35 ("For surely the sex laws of the United States today
reflect a formidable mass schizophrenia. The split between our society's permissive-even obsessive-
sexual behavior and attitudes, and our punitive, puritanical statutes is indeed scarcely credible.").
177. The precise boundaries of the state's control of adult sexuality are unclear. However, consider,
for example, the Supreme Court's language in Lawrence v. Texas acknowledging an "emerging
awareness that liberty gives substantial protection to adult persons in deciding how to conduct their
private lives in matters pertaining to sex." 539 U.S. 558, 572 (2003). See also Cass R. Sunstein, Liberty
After Lawrence, 65 OHIO ST. L.J. 1059 (2004) (discussing the potential implications of Lawrence).
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heart," the Supreme Court has ruled that it "cannot adopt a parallel assumption
about adult women. Many have protested and challenged this differential
treatment,1 79 but adolescents apparently remain a valid target for restrictions
even as courts have been more skeptical of constraints on adult women. As a
result, examining laws regulating teen sexuality makes apparent the continued
imposition of traditionalist views of gender and sexuality in a way that would
be obscured by looking at more generally applicable restrictions.
To the extent that American courts have deemed promoting procreation a
legitimate state interest, the means here are unacceptable. The state should not
promote childbearing on the backs of young women who are less than willing
or who did not consent independently to the pregnancy. The law should be
neutral on this question insofar as it speaks to gender roles. Because of a
history of gender relations that assumed women's homemaker status, the law
should not impose such asymmetrical obstacles. Legislatures should express a
preference for childbirth-if they desire to do so-through a means that does
not constrain choice relative to other options, but enhances it.'80
Even beyond the practical effects of laws on the lives of teens, we should
be concerned about the messages being sent to young women-that sex should
be punished, that they are more properly mothers than autonomous, potentially
non-maternal persons. When a pregnant teen surveys her options, abortion is
not positioned as one of several equal choices. Rather, accessing the procedure
may very well be the path of most resistance:
[A]s the decision not to become a mother must be actualized through
an abortion, both the reproductive choice and the effectuating medical
procedure of a young woman seeking to avoid maternity are subject to
adult scrutiny, whereas a teen wishing to become a mother enjoys
178. Planned Parenthood of Se. Pa. v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 895 (1992).
179. See, e.g., Planned Parenthood of Cent. Mo. v. Danforth, 392 F. Supp. 1362, 1376 (E.D. Mo.
1975) (Webster, J., dissenting in part) ("I cannot see why [a minor] would not be entitled to the same
right of self-determination now explicitly accorded to adult women, provided she is sufficiently mature
to understand the procedure and to make an intelligent assessment of her circumstances with the advice
of her physician."), af'd in part, revd in part, 428 U.S. 52 (1976); Rex, supra note 71, at 108-18 (citing
empirical evidence, including testimony on child abuse, to challenge "the Court's prior refusal to find
parental consent provisions unduly burdensome for pregnant minors" even as it struck down notification
requirements for adult women).
This is not to suggest that conservative groups have abandoned attempts to limit adult
women's sexual and reproductive agency. Professor Reva Siegel has documented the ascension and
success of "woman-protective abortion arguments." Reva B. Siegel, The Right's Reasons: Constitutional
Conflict and the Spread of Woman-Protective Antiabortion Argument, 57 DUKE L.J. 1641 (2008).
180. Cf Linda Greenhouse & Reva B. Siegel, Casey and the Clinic Closings: When "Protecting
Health" Obstructs Choice, 125 YALE L.J. 1428, 1437 (2016) (discussing how, under Casey, "[i]f
government wants to protect unborn life, it has to respectfully enlist women in this project and cannot
simply commandeer women's lives for these purposes"). This logic from Casey, although focused upon
adult women, should apply equally to minors-particularly those who are already granted significant
autonomy in other comparable spheres.
202 [Vol. 28:171
Note: Mind the Gap
decisional autonomy over her reproductive choice as well as its
effectuation through pregnancy-related medical care.' 8 '
The independence that age of consent laws grant, which is retained should
a minor choose to carry to term, is revoked if she decides she wants to
terminate her pregnancy. Whatever the reasons for the law's development, the
current asymmetry communicates the relative value and dangers of particular
choices. This expressive element should be of particular concern and justifies
reform of the current regime of teen sexuality laws.
VI. RECOMMENDATIONS
In my view, in a society dedicated to prioritizing the equality of women
and girls over other values, abortion restrictions would not be imposed upon
young women, and feminists would debate the propriety and severity of
statutory rape laws, attentive to minors' autonomy and protection. However,
such an admittedly subjective utopia is unlikely to emerge in the United States.
Parental involvement laws have remained popular among members of both
major parties.182 Further, there is division in attitudes about the morality and
legality of abortion, and at least widespread tacit acceptance that laws may
legitimately single out abortion.' Thus, despite the dangers of wide judicial
discretion and risk of sexist administration, reform is likely a more palatable
option. If these laws are to be maintained, they should be altered to minimize
the harm specific to the gap between the ages at which one can legally have sex
with one's partner and when one can independently obtain an abortion. If laws
are going to permit young people to have sex, they should give female-bodied
minors access to all of the choices to manage its consequences. We have
recognized the importance of minors' independent consent in many other
medical and sex-related contexts, and should do so with regard to abortion as
well.
There are some who argue that more wholesale reform of statutory rape
laws, including higher ages of consent or a reassessment of the relevance of
age, may be important for the protection of female persons.' These
181. Ehrlich, supra note 103, at 146.
I 82. See GALLUP, supra note 95; Lydia Saad, Americans Favor Parental Involvement in Teen
Abortion Decisions, GALLUP (Nov. 30, 2005), http://www.gallup.com/polV20203/americans-favor-
parental-involvement-teen-abortion-decisions.aspx.
183. See supra notes 95-97 and accompanying text; see also supra Section IV.C.
184. See Kitrosser, supra note 69, at 289 (concluding "that the solution to substantive inequality in
sexual relations between boys and girls and men and women is no longer the per se criminalization of
sexual activity with young girls"); Oberman, supra note 74, at 42 ("Despite the fact that statutory rape
laws are premised upon the belief that young girls are too easily coerced to effectively consent to sex,
they largely ignore the sources of girls' vulnerability, and the relative power of the parties having sex
with them.... Instead, the law focuses on factors more readily identified, such as age differences, and
whether the victim was a 'virgin' or 'promiscuous.' This approach is compelling only if a girl, by virtue
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considerations may play a role in debates over the proper elements of laws, and
some states may, having evaluated the impact of altering various minor consent
laws, decide that some intermediate, unified age is the most appropriate. This
compromise-perhaps a lowered abortion age paired with an increased age of
consent-is not ideal for reasons outlined below, but would at least partially
vindicate important autonomy values. If members of the public and government
engage in these debates in a way that is attentive to female autonomy and
subsequently determine that a higher age is appropriate for both legal sex and
independent abortion access, then at least the asymmetry of the current regime
will be remedied.
A. Align Ages at the State's Age of Sexual Consent
Within a single state, the age at which a minor can legally obtain an
abortion without mandated adult involvement should be aligned with the age at
which she can legally consent to sex. Doing so will help minimize burdens to
access for those minors already permitted to act like adults in many related
contexts. Aligning the ages will also prevent those engaging in legal sex from
being forced to confront the obstacle of judicial bypass. At a minimum, it will
ensure that the punishing hearing process will be imposed only upon a smaller
group consisting of minors whose decision-making the law consistently dictates
may benefit from adult intervention. Further, matching a state's age of consent
and parental involvement laws will ensure that the law is oriented neutrally
toward the various life options available to sexually active girls. Such a change
guarantees that, just as motherhood is immediately available to an adolescent
engaged in legal sex, so too is a procedure that declines motherhood. Aligning
the ages will address the practical obstacles to access, punitive procedures
following legal sex, and biased orientation of the law toward traditionally
feminine, maternal roles.
In aligning these two laws, the age of independent abortion should be
lowered to the age of consent, not vice versa. This arrangement would better
correspond with other statutory affirmations of minors' ability to medically
consent and would avoid undermining the goals of health policies. This is
important both for ease of enforcement and protection of public health. Raising
the age of consent to match abortion laws would have ramifications for
mandatory reporters and would re-classify a variety of previously legal sexual
relationships as criminal. Further, "[i]f states were to raise the legal age of
consent to eighteen for the purposes of statutory consistency, this would also
likely impact the willingness of underage teens to seek out contraceptives, STI
of becoming sexually active, suddenly gains all of the power and control necessary to give a meaningful
consent (or refusal) to sex." (footnotes omitted)); Olsen, supra note 13 (discussing feminist debates
about rights and the meaning of sexuality in the context of statutory rape laws).
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treatments and reproductive care for fear of legal consequences."' To avoid
confusing the current organization of statutory rape laws and their enforcement,
and to encourage teens to access health care, the age of consent should not be
raised to match parental involvement laws, many of which are set at the age of
eighteen. Doing so would have consequences for adolescents that would
undermine the benefits of reform.
Expressively and morally, there is also a value to promoting bodily
autonomy by granting sexual and reproductive agency to more young girls
rather than fewer. Raising the age of consent simply to align with abortion
restrictions would exacerbate the paternalism of parental involvement laws and
further expand state control of sexuality.'8 Given the current structure of other
medical consent laws, including access to prenatal care, it is important that girls
have access to a full range of choices at as young an age as they may legally
have sex. If the laws are to be matched, as would be ideal, it should be done in
a way that intervenes in the agency of minors as minimally as possible.
B. Align Ages at the State's Minimum Age of Sexual Conduct
The above recommendation is complicated by the fact that the majority of
states do not have a unitary age at which they permit sexual activity. Most
states allow some form of sexual conduct with minors who are below the age of
consent when certain conditions are met.'8 For example, a state that sets its age
of consent at sixteen may permit sexual intercourse with a fourteen-year-old
when the partner is within a certain age range or below a set maximum age. As
a result, for some younger minors, the legality of their sexual conduct is
conditioned on the age of their partner.
This reality does not lend itself easily to a system that bases the age of
independent abortion on when sexual activity is deemed legal. Because
conditioning one's access to health care on the age of a third party is
undesirable, these minors must all be either granted the right to an independent
abortion or subjected to parental involvement laws. For the reasons enumerated
above, including the need to provide the full array of health care options to
sexually active minors, states should opt for the former. Expanding abortion
access without a parental involvement requirement to younger minors, although
consistent with principles of autonomy, is likely a political non-starter. Those
on either side of a political debate may opt to distinguish minors whose sex is
only legal under narrow circumstances from those above the age of consent.
185. Phillis, supra note 81, at 296.
186. See, e.g., id. at 291 ("They serve to reinforce a paternalistic vision of the law as protecting
immature minor women, except where maturity is obtained through the acceptance of pregnancy and
motherhood."); Eidson, supra note 6, at 766-67 (noting that "statutory rape laws invoke the benevolent
parens patriae power of the state to 'protect' young females and punish male ravishers").
187. See generally Glosser et al., supra note 61.
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The provisions that do not punish sexual conduct with this subset of younger
minors are often more concerned with when prosecution is appropriate than
with minors' maturity or capacity.188 Even if the age at which adult abortion
rights should attach is debated (as is likely given the current variation state-to-
state), the "gap" between legal sex and abortion access should be closed.
C. Presume "Maturity "for Those Above the Age of Consent
If state governments are reluctant to alter the ages within parental
involvement laws or, as is likely given our current political climate, unable to
garner the political support for such a measure, then the way these laws are
implemented should be changed. Altering the standards used to decide whether
to grant a bypass petition could achieve several of the same goals. Suellyn
Scarnecchia and Julie Kunce Field, practitioners in the field of judicial bypass,
propose presumptions that they argue, "if adopted by the court, will simplify
the decision, make it more predictable, and still protect both the interests of
parents and the constitutional rights of the affected minor girls."'89 They
suggest, among others, a presumption of maturity based on age, "[flor instance,
teens sixteen and over should be presumed mature. These teens are at an
advanced level of cognitive development and are at the age of consent for
sex." 90 An age-based maturity presumption would prevent a minor who
decides to have sex from facing an inconsistent legal regime in which the
presumption of her maturity depends on whether she opts to become a mother
or not. At the very least, such a presumption would lessen the evidentiary
burden on those who face a pregnancy as a result of their legal sex.
Ultimately, this regulation-based presumption framework would not
address as many concerns as more overt amendments. Given the high
likelihood that a petition will be granted even under the current system,191 the
practical effect of this change would be small. Implementing a presumption
could potentially, for those over the age of consent, lessen the stress and
uncertainty accompanying the hearings, but it would still require them to
confront barriers to abortion when there are no such legal hurdles to becoming
a parent. Even with a built-in presumption, the law would still require minors
who have implicitly been deemed mature enough to have sex to go through a
punishing hearing process before accessing an abortion. However, a primary
reason to favor an age presumption over no action is the expressive shift that
may result from publicizing such a presumption. A publicly known
presumption of maturity for those who can consent to sex would signal to girls
188. Id. at 6-7. For example, through either minimum ages of defendants or age-gap provisions,
many states establish a minimum age at which a would-be defendant may be prosecuted.
189. Scamecchia & Field, supra note 42, at 98.
190. Id. at 111.
191. See supra note 148 and accompanying text.
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that the law assumes they should be able to access abortion as easily as they
can access motherhood-that is to say, as soon as the law grants them the right
to have sex.
CONCLUSION
Mandating that pregnant minors go through a strenuous judicial bypass
procedure for years after the state recognizes the legality of their sex deprives
them of agency that they should be afforded. The current structure imposes
burdens beyond what is justified by parental and state interests, punishes legal
sex, and evinces messages about the roles of female persons. Granted, there are
benefits to retaining the existing formulations of these laws, and many hold
views of abortion and sex that do not demand alterations.
Still, a structure of law that presumptively grants a right to become a
mother but puts hurdles in the path of those seeking to halt gestation confines
the possibilities for young women. I have argued for a formulation that works
to respect the sexual autonomy of adolescents rather than provide opportunities
to moralize teenage sexuality-especially when there is a risk of that evaluation
being done through a gendered lens. A regime that structures the options of
girls in a way that is preferentially weighted toward traditionally feminine roles
has implications even beyond those particular cases, implications that are
troubling and should prompt us to challenge our current acceptance of the
status quo. To the extent that an argument in this register is normative and
seeks to vindicate only a particular set of values, consider this a plea for an
emphasis on equality and respect for bodily autonomy, even for adolescents.
Looking forward, whether these values win out over others-indeed, whether
the intersection of these laws is discussed at all-must and will be collectively
determined. What debates do occur among adults-in legislative chambers, in
courtrooms, in strategy sessions-should pay great attention to the impact on
adolescents whose "maturity" is context-specific and whose choices are
unbalanced.
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APPENDIX A: THE AGE GAP, STATE BY STATE
Age of Independent Age of Consent to





California Law Enjoined 18
Colorado 18 17
Connecticut No Restriction 16
Delaware 16 18
D.C. No Restriction 16
Florida 18 18
Georgia 18 16















Montana Law Enjoined 16
Nebraska 18 16
Nevada Law Enjoined 16
New Hampshire 18 16
New Jersey Law Enjoined 16
New Mexico Law Enjoined 16
New York No Restriction 17
North Carolina 18 16
North Dakota 18 18
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Age of Independent Age of Consent to
State Abortion Sexual Intercourse*
Ohio 18 16
Oklahoma 18 16
Oregon No Restriction 18
Pennsylvania 18 16
Rhode Island 18 16
South Carolina 17 16




Vermont No Restriction 16
Virginia 18 18
Washington No Restriction 16
West Virginia 18 16
Wisconsin 18 18
Wyoming 18 16
*Most states permit sexual intercourse or sexual contact with persons
younger than the age of consent under certain circumstances, usually
dependent on the age difference between the parties
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